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This paper focuses on inequality in living standards across oblasts and regions within 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Regional 
inequality is an important area of research and policy development. Inequality in 
income and consumption are logical outcomes in a market-based economic system. If 
inequality within countries exists because of barriers to competition, then inequality can 
foment internal tension, and economic and social development within countries is 
negatively affected.  We examine Living Standards Measurement data from Tajikistan, 
Kyrgystan, and Kazakhstan and additional survey data from Uzbekistan. We find that 
the most important explanations for the variation in expenditures per capita in the region 
are household location, household composition, and education. We find large variation 
in per capita expenditure by location within each country, and the differences go beyond 
the simple rural-urban distinction. Family structure is also important, and in all.../… 
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countries, having a university educated household head significantly improves 
household welfare; expenditures are higher in these households than in households with 
less educated heads.  We examine inequality in access to community services and find 
that provision of public goods reinforces regional inequality patterns in expenditures 
that we measure among households. The poorest households are likely to live in 
communities with the lowest access to public services. 
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Introduction 
The five Central Asian states emerged as new independent countries during the second half 
of 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. They were, together with Azerbaijan, the 
poorest Soviet republics, although human development indicators, such as almost universal 
literacy and life expectancies of 66-69 years, were high (World Bank 1993). Assessments 
of economic performance since independence have focused on outcomes at the national 
level or on the distribution of household expenditures. By the end of the 1990s output had 
not recovered its 1991 level, and inequality and poverty were substantially higher than in 
1991.1  
 
This paper focuses on an intermediate unit of analysis, oblasts and regions within 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.2 Regional 
inequality is an important area of research and policy development. Inequality in income 
and consumption are logical outcomes in a market-based economic system; labor is 
rewarded for its productivity, and inherent individual differences in ability and skill are 
associated with variation in income. When investment in human capital is not rewarded, 
macroeconomic performance suffers. In many cases, however, economic inequality is not 
primarily the result of differences in skill or performance but is the result of barriers to 
entry into good jobs or labor markets, unequal access to productive resources, and other 
constraints on competitive market interaction. If inequality within countries exists because 
of these barriers to competition, then inequality can foment internal tension, and economic 
and social development within countries is negatively affected. 
 
Central Asia experienced large changes in its political, social, and economic institutions 
since independence in the early 1990s. In this paper, we document how these changes 
affected the distribution of public and private resources across and within countries. We 
attribute part of these regional adjustments to inequality in human capital and dependency 
but find that most of the inequality is the result of regional differences. These regional 
differences within countries are large and growing over time and are not simply due to 
rural-urban differences. Regional inequality is reinforced by the public sector in the 
allocation of public services. Our discussion motivates public policy that can redress, to a 
certain extent, the inequalities we measure. To our knowledge, there is little published 
information on the spatial dimension of inequality in Central Asia. The Central Asian 
region is of increasing political importance, and an understanding of its people and the 
problems they face is essential to the development of regional stability. 
 
                                                 
1 Pomfret and Anderson (2001) review this literature.  For general background on the Central Asian 
countries’ economies, see Pomfret (1995) and Islamov (2001). 
2 The oblasts are listed in Appendix 1. Although the official name for these administrative units has been 
changed in some of the successor states, the Russian term ‘oblast’ remains in common usage.   2
The opening section provides background information by describing the main ethnic, sub-
ethnic and supranational groups. Section 2 presents evidence on spatial inequality within 
the five economies. The third section offers explanations of the level of and trends in 
spatial inequality. Section 4 analyses the consequences of spatial inequality. The final 
section draws some conclusions. 
1 Background 
None of the five countries had any previous history as a nation state. Although some have 
tried to create legitimacy by harking back to past rulers, the link is far from direct and the 
territory different.3 The current borders are those of the eponymous Soviet republics which 
had been established by the delimitation of 1924, and by subsequent revisions which were 
essentially completed by 1936. 
 
The delimitation by Stalin is a source of controversy. In broad terms, by dividing the 
Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic (established in 1918 as a successor to the Tsarist 
Governor Generalship) into smaller units, it was a case of divide and rule aimed at 
discouraging any sense of a unified Turkestan. That policy was successful, insofar as, since 
the defeat of the basmachi movement in the early 1920s, there has been no serious 
PanTurkic pressure in the region. 
 
Whether the details of republic boundaries were aimed to cause discord is more debatable. 
Some Central Asian nationalists are convinced in a conspiracy theory. Tajiks see a plot in 
the separation of their Soviet republic from their chief historical cities of Samarkand and 
Bukhara. The Khorezm oasis was divided between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, leaving 
a concentrated Uzbek minority in the Dashkoguz oblast of Turkmenistan. The densely 
populated and ethnically intermingled Ferghana Valley posed the most difficult problem, 
which was dealt with by convoluted borders separating the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek 
republics and by creating three small enclaves as part of the Uzbek republic but surrounded 
by Kyrgyz territory.4 Although the outcome was messy, some outside observers conclude 
that ‘the Russian linguists, anthropologists, and politicians had done fairly competent 
work’ in determining republic boundaries (Soucek 2000). The ethnic groups were 
intermingled, in particular where urban and surrounding rural populations differed and in 
the Ferghana Valley, so that any solution would be imperfect.5  
                                                 
3 For Tajikistan the Samanid Empire (874-1005AD) marked the formation of the Tajik nation, with a 
common language, territory and culture’ (UNDP 2000a:41). In Tashkent the main statue of Karl Marx was 
replaced by one of the Emir Timur (Tamerlaine) in 1993. These forerunners governed territory far beyond the 
present boundaries of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.   
4 Most of the Ferghana Valley is in Uzbekistan, but the uplands are in the Kyrgyz Republic, which controls 
vital water supplies, and the mouth of the valley is in Tajikistan. 
5 Before 1917 the urban population was often divided into European and Sart (or ‘native’), a general term for 
all Central Asian groups. As mentioned, however, Bukhara and Samarkand were considered to be Tajik 
cities, while Tashkent was an Uzbek (and Russian) city surrounded by Kazakh countryside, and Osh and   3
 
During the Soviet era the issue became more complex because the USSR was treated in 
many respects as a single unit, with republican boundaries having little real significance, 
and yet there was a growth of identity among the titular nationalities. Several waves of 
migration increased the ethnic complexity. During the 1930s, many from Central Asian 
fled from the region in response to forced collectivization and political purges, and many 
more died. During the 1941-45 war Stalin deported groups whom he considered 
untrustworthy from regions near the front line to Central Asia, notably Volga Germans and 
Crimean Tatars from the west and Koreans from the east of the USSR. There was also an 
ongoing pattern of political prisoners being exiled in Central Asia. During the 1950s 
Khrushchev organized the Virgin Lands program which brought many new settlers to 
northern Kazakhstan, reinforcing a pattern that had existed since Tsarist times of 
Europeans from within the empire moving to fertile land in northern Kyrgyzstan and in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
Despite the rhetoric of comradeship, ethnic antagonisms existed beneath the Soviet 
surface. After a soccer game in Tashkent in May 1969, Uzbek and Russian youths fought 
in the streets following chants from the former ‘Russians go home’ in reaction to granting 
of housing privileges to Russians involved in the reconstruction following the 1966 
earthquake. The deal made by Brezhnev was to leave the Uzbek First Secretary with a 
fairly free hand in return for maintenance of political stability. Sharof Rashidov, first 
secretary during 1959-83, died just before Andropov and Gorbachev launched the anti-
corruption campaign in which the Uzbek elite was the prime target. Despite official 
demonization of Rashidov for corruption, he remained a local hero for channelling billions 
of rubles surreptitiously into the republic and, after independence, a major street in 
Tashkent was named after him.6 Attempts by Gorbachev to establish first secretaries loyal 
to Moscow failed and in 1989 he appointed a local technocrat, Islam Karimov, who owed 
nothing to the central government and who appropriated much of the opposition’s Uzbek 
nationalism when he became president of Uzbekistan in 1991. 
 
A similar pattern occurred in the other populous Central Asian republic. The powerful 
Kazakh leader, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who had been first secretary since 1960 was 
dismissed by Gorbachev in 1986 for corruption. After the appointment of a Russian as his 
replacement, a large demonstration in the Kazakh capital was dispersed by force, leaving 
two people dead. Subsequently, Gorbachev backed down, and in 1989 he appointed 
Nursultan Nazarbayev as first secretary, a Kazakh whose career had been promoted by 
                                                                                                                                                    
Jalalabad were towns with Uzbek majorities surrounded by countrysides of mixed, but dominantly Kyrgyz 
ethnicity.  
6 This popularity appears to be fairly general, despite the awful practices of some of Rashidov’s associates in 
this quasi-feudal regime (Rumer 1989:144-59), and is a sign of the growth of Uzbek national consciousness 
during the Rashidov era. In their study of the Uzbek city, Koroteyeva and Makarova (1998) provide evidence 
from Samarkand that during the 1960s, with the satisfaction of basic needs and rise of consumerism, Central 
Asians began to reassert traditional consumption patterns, notably in connection with major life event 
ceremonies such as circumcision, marriage or death.   4
Kunaev and who metamorphosed into president of Kazakhstan.7 Under Kunaev, 
Kazakhization of the political and administrative system was substantial and Kazakhs were 
favoured in access to higher education, so that by 1989 a national identity had been forged 
and this was promoted by Nazarbayev (Melvin 1995:106). Today a prominent statue in 
Almaty commemorates the nationalist martyrs of December 1986. 
 
Inter-ethnic tensions became more open in the final years of the USSR, although never on 
the scale of events in the Caucasus. The most serious clashes in Central Asia occurred in 
June 1990 when the border between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz republics had to be closed to 
prevent an armed mob of about fifteen thousand Uzbeks from crossing into the Kyrgyz 
republic to assist their co-ethnics involved in land disputes in the neighbourhood of Osh. 
The political fall-out from the Osh riots was severe enough to lead to the fall of the Kyrgyz 
first secretary and his replacement by the head of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Askar 
Akaev, who became the most liberal president in the region after 1991. The area around 
Osh, and indeed the whole Ferghana Valley, remains a potential tinderbox of ethnic 
disputes, exacerbated by the concentration of the most avid Islamic groups in this densely 
populated area.8 
 
The ethnic composition has changed in important respects since the 1989 census. Many 
non-Central Asian groups emigrated in the early 1990s. People with a claim to German 
blood ‘returned’ to Germany, and this group has almost disappeared from Kazakhstan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic. Slavs had a more difficult choice; many had lived in Central Asia for 
several generations and felt divided loyalties, but over a million Russians emigrated 
between 1990 and 1996 (Olcott 1996). Kazakhstan encouraged the return of ethnic 
Kazakhs who had moved to Mongolia or western China earlier in the twentieth century,9 
but this was on a smaller scale and since 1991 the net effect in Kazakhstan (and to a lesser 
extent the Kyrgyz Republic) has been substantial emigration, amounting to almost ten 
percent of the 1989 population (Heleniak 1997). Net emigration has roughly been balanced 
by natural increase in the Kyrgyz Republic, but in Kazakhstan the population dropped from 
17.1 million at independence to 15.4 million in 1999.10 The selective effect of emigration 
on the ethnic composition of the remaining population is illustrated by the 1999 census in 
                                                 
7 The catalyst for change was in June 1989 with ethnic riots in Novy Uzen in the southwest of the republic, 
but little is known about the scale of these disturbances. The Kazakh republic was the only Central Asian 
republic in which major demonstrations against the Soviet Union occurred in 1989-91, but these focused on 
environmental issues, especially the dumping of nuclear waste in the republic, rather than ethnic issues. 
8 In November 1991 an Islamic Centre was established in Namangan and that oblast (one of three in the 
Uzbekistan part of the Ferghana Valley) was under Islamic control until suppressed by the Uzbekistan 
security forces, successors to the Soviet KGB, in March 1992 (Ro’i forthcoming). 
9 The Human Development Report Kazakhstan 2000 (p.6) estimates repatriates to number 360,000 by the 
end of the 1990s. This was part of a conscious policy to improve the Kazakh population balance. In 1994 
parliament approved transfer of the capital of Kazakhstan and the new capital, Astana, was officially 
inaugurated in June 1998; one motive for this expensive move was to bring the centre of government closer 
to the Russian belt. 
10 ESCAP Population Data Sheet, August 1992.   5
the Kyrgyz Republic (Table 1), where the combined share of Russians, Ukrainians and 
Germans dropped from almost a third in 1979 to a seventh of the total in 1999, and Uzbeks 
displaced Russians as the largest minority. There has also been economic migration from 
Central Asia, especially by Tajiks since the late 1990s, although it is unclear how many of 
these are temporary migrants and how many have left their country permanently.11 
Table 1: Ethnic composition of the Kyrgyz Republic (in thousands, from 1979, 1989 and 
1999 censuses) 
 1979  1989  1999 
 Number  Percent Number Percent Number  Percent 
Kyrgyz 1,687  47.9 2,230 52.4 3,128  64.9 
Uzbeks 426  12.1 550 12.9 665  13.8 
Russians 912  25.9 917 21.5 603  12.5 
Dungans 27  0.8 37 0.9 52  1.1 
Ukrainians 109  3.1 108 2.5 50  1.0 
Uigurs 30  0.8 47 0.9 47  1.0 
Tatars 72  2.0 70 1.6 45  0.9 
Kazakhs 27  0.8 37 0.9 43  0.9 
Tajiks 23  0.7 34 0.8 43  0.9 
Turks 5  0.1 21 0.5 33  0.7 
Germans 101  2.9 101 2.4 21  0.4 
Koreans 14  0.4 18 0.4 20  0.4 
Others 89  2.5 98 2.3 72  1.5 
Total 3,523 4,258 4,823   
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic; main results of the First National Population 
Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 1999 (National Statistics Committee 2000:26). 
 
Sub-ethnic divisions are also important in Central Asia, and some observers believe they 
are more important than the ethnicities defined by Stalin in the 1920s. In Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan, where the titular nationality has a relatively more 
recent nomadic past, tribal groupings remain strong. Turkmenistan’s national flag 
incorporates five carpet designs belonging to the main tribes (Akhal Teke, Yumot, Salar, 
Ersari and Kerki), and the country’s oblasts approximate tribal boundaries. Although the 
Akhal Teke, whose territory includes the national capital, have been dominant, President 
Niyazov styles himself Turkmenbashi (head of all Turkmen) and emphasises the 
motherland as the prime locus of loyalty (Akbarzadeh 1999), although it is unclear to what 
extent the Yumot in Balkan and Dashoguz oblasts or Ersari and Kerki in Lebap accept 
national over tribal allegiance. Kazakhs owe allegiance to the Great Horde (two million in 
1989), Middle Horde (three million in 1989) or Little Horde (1.5 million in 1989), and 
there are tensions between President Nazarbayev as leader of the Great Horde and leaders 
                                                 
11 There is also a much publicized trafficking in women, which appears to mainly involve Kyrgyz citizens 
being tempted to the Gulf states.   6
of the Middle Horde, which had been pre-eminent before the 1960s. Askar Akaev, 
President of the Kyrgyz Republic, represents the northern region and the Sary Bagysh 
tribe, while Kyrgyz (as well as Uzbeks) in the south of the country feel excluded. In 
Tajikistan the civil war that waged through most of the 1990s pitted three Tajik groups 
(from Leninabad in the north, Gulab in the south, and Garm in the east) against one 
another, while the Pamiri people in the Gorno Badakhshan autonomous oblast are 
distinct.12 In Uzbekistan, which contains the sedentary heart of the region, the elite is 
divided into geographical factions, identified with Samarkand/Bukhara in the centre/west, 
Kashkardiya in the south, Tashkent in the north and Ferghana in the east, with the 
Samarkand group currently dominant. 
 
The present situation consists of overlapping loyalties, which remain fluid. Despite the lack 
of genuine historical legitimacy, the five Soviet republics created some degree of national 
consciousness, which has been strengthened since independence in all except Tajikistan. 
At the same time ethnic and sub-ethnic ties remain strong, and they have a geographical 
dimension which makes spatial inequalities potentially inflammatory. At the supranational 
level, concerns about pan-Turkism have proven unfounded, and Tajik links to its co-
linguist Iran are even weaker. On the other hand, Islam is the common religion, although 
here too there are distinctions. 
 
The hold of Islam is much weaker in the northern and traditionally more nomadic or 
pastoralist parts of Central Asia; i.e., Kazakhstan, Karakalpakstan, Turkmenistan and 
northern Kyrgyz Republic. In Uzbekistan President Karimov is committed to establishing a 
secular state accommodating its Islamic heritage. In 1992 he took the oath of office on the 
Koran, but he has increasingly staked his legitimacy on being a bulwark against religious 
extremism. In 1997 riots in Namangan left several policemen dead, and the severed head of 
one of them was displayed by the rebels in the town centre. In February 1999, bombs, 
ostensibly aimed at the president himself, killed several people in downtown Tashkent. The 
most serious battles have occurred in the Ferghana Valley where Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) incursions in the summers of 1999 and 2000 led to Uzbek planes 
bombing terrorist targets in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic and the laying of mines 
along the border.13 
 
                                                 
12 They are the only group in the region which follows the Ishmaeli branch of Islam, recognizing the Aga 
Khan as their spiritual leader. Within the GBAO, Tajik is the official language, but Shugnan, Rushan, Vahan, 
Yazgulam, Russian and Kyrgyz are also used as languages of instruction in secondary schools.  The civil war 
initially confronted factions from Gulab and Leninabad, supported by Russia and Uzbekistan, against Garmis 
and Badakhshanis, but around 1994 the apparent victors fell out as the Gulab group, which had done most of 
the fighting, and the Leninabad group, which had been dominant in the Soviet era, disagreed over how to 
share power. 
13 Both Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic protested the 1999 bombings, which killed citizens of both 
countries. Dozens of people in Tajikistan, mainly children, have died from landmines. According to The 
Economist (27 January 2001) over thirty Kyrgyz and at least two hundred Uzbek soldiers died repelling IMU 
incursions in 2000.   7
The protracted civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 until (and by some accounts beyond) the 
June 1997 peace agreement is generally seen as a regional conflict, driven by competition 
for resources rather than over beliefs. Nevertheless, the war had a religious component 
with Islamic groups supporting the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), and the growing 
poverty reinforced the politicization of Islam.14 The UTO, and the IMU, are succoured by 
supporters in Afghanistan, and the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are involved 
in supporting co-ethnic groups fighting in the northern alliance in the Afghanistan conflict. 
Heightened instability in Afghanistan could easily spill over into Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
 
The regional, sub-ethnic or tribal, ethnic, national and supranational sources of tension 
often merge in practice. Kyrgyz and Tajik protests over Uzbek bombing and mining of 
their territory are partly driven by concerns that Uzbekistan’s territorial designs are being 
hidden behind an anti-terrorist rhetoric. In November 1998, Makhmud Khudoberdyev, an 
ethnic Uzbek who had been an army colonel in Tajikistan before splitting with President 
Rakhmanov and fleeing to Uzbekistan, led a military force which occupied Khudjand 
before being driven out by Tajikistan government forces; President Rakhmanov of 
Tajikistan initially denounced this as a coup attempt supported by Uzbekistan with the 
intention of promoting secession by Leninabad oblast, although later both governments 
downplayed the incident. The first explicit attempt to revise the national borders occurred 
in the winter of 2000/1, when Uzbekistan started pressing for territory to provide corridors 
to its enclaves in the Kyrgyz Republic’s portion of the Ferghana Valley and supported its 
claim by cutting off gas supplies to the Kyrgyz Republic.15   
2 Descriptive  evidence 
Income levels varied across Soviet republics and also within them. Since independence, 
intrarepublic differentials appear to have widened. In general, the people in the capital 
cities were best able to benefit from the opportunities of the market economies or best able 
to protect themselves from the huge negative shocks. In Kazakhstan, proximity to Russia 
also seems to have been a positive factor as the northern part of the country did relatively 
well. 
 
Table 2 presents conceptually comparable measures of GDP per capita at purchasing 
power parity (PPP) for the oblasts of  Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, as 
                                                 
14 In this sense it mirrored the situation in Afghanistan, where regional groups fought for the succession after 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops. There the outcome was an extreme Islamic regime. 
15 The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan note that Uzbekistan seems to be in no hurry to complete 
demarcation of indeterminate boundary areas with them, but is progressing with demarcation of the border 
with its larger neighbour, Kazakhstan. Assets such as military equipment or civilian aircraft were taken over 
by the successor state on whose territory they were to be found when the USSR was dissolved in late 1991, 
and Uzbekistan inherited the strongest army in the region because Tashkent was the centre of the Soviet 
Central Asian military command.   8
Table 2: Real per capita GDP by region 
(a) Kazakhstan 
Oblys  Real GDP per capita (in PPP $) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999
Akmola (incl. Astana)  3,153 3,420 3,061 3,218 3,710 4,066
Almaty 2,008 2,263 2,919 2,942 2,671  2,437
   Almaty City  6,725 5,188 9,369 10,980 10,730  11,935
Aqtöbe 4,804 4,977 4,204 5,311 5,639  5,246
Atyrau 8,031 9,988 11,096 12,155 9,807  14,677
East Kazakhstan  5,224 5,063 4,394 4,826 5,238  4,811
Karaganda 8,950 7,444 5,257 5,836 5,718  6,176
Mangystau 10,623 11,894 13,571 10,461 7,967 10,130
North Kazakhstan  5,928 5,790 6,405 4,986 3,620 4,334
Pavlodar 8,456 8,488 7,376 5,439 10,822  10,235
Qostanay 5,494 4,320 4,019 5,721 5,137 4,603
Qyzylorda 2,174 2,662 3,155 3,206 2,712 2,838
South Kazakhstan  1,336 1,611 2,304 2,333 2,127 2,080
West Kazakhstan  2,897 2,962 2,693 4,100 4,091 5,438
Zhambyl 1,638 1,556 2,501 2,178 1,983  1,952
(b) Kyrgyz Republic 1996-99 
Oblast   
 1996 1997 1998  1999
North:   
Bishkek 3,663 3,762 4,231  4,340
Chuy (excl.Bishkek)  3,651 3,927 3,617  3,776
Centre (mountain region):   
Issyk-Kul 1,577 2,734 3,372  3,517
Naryn 1,890 2,200 2,131  2,218
Talas 1,766 1,794 1,656  1,718
South:   
Jalalabad 1,470 1,424 1,380  1,421
Osh 1,117 1,088 997  1,024
Batken 1,010  1,039
(c) Uzbekistan 1999 
Oblast  Real GDP per capita  (1999 
  (in PPP$)  (as percent of national average) 
Uzbekistan 2,994  100 
Northern Uzbekistan:     
Karakalpakstan 2,023  85 
Khorezm 3,148  105 
table continues…   9
Central Uzbekistan     
Bukhara 3,863  129 
Dzhizak 2,278  76 
Navoi 3,948  132 
Samarkand 2,464  82 
Syrdarya 3,100  104 
Southern Uzbekistan     
Kashkadarya 2,458  82 
Surkhandarya 2,225  74 
Eastern Uzbekistan     
Andijan 2,796  93 
Fergana 3,106  104 
Namangan 1,965  66 
Tashkent 3,165  106 
Tashkent City  5,543  185 
Source:  Human Development Report: Kazakhstan (UNDP 2000b:56-7). Human Development Report: 
Kyrgyzstan (UNDP 2000c:64-5). Human Development Report: Uzbekistan (UNDP 2000d:60). 
 
reported in the various national Human Development Reports prepared under the aegis of 
local UNDP offices. They illustrate the significantly higher income levels in Kazakhstan 
and more equal spatial distribution in Uzbekistan, as well as bringing out some of the 
major intracountry variations. As measures of well being, however, these data must be 
treated with caution. There are substantial data problems, including both the reliability of 
the raw data and the choice of PPP conversion rates. Moreover, because they are output 
measures they may not reflect final claims on resources; this is especially true of 
Kazakhstan where the western oblasts of Atyrau and Mangistau produce most of the oil, 
but the economic benefits accrue elsewhere, especially in the commercial centre, Almaty. 
Unfortunately, similar measures are not reported in the national Human Development 
Reports prepared in Tajikistan or Turkmenistan. 
 
The best distributional evidence comes from the Living Standards Measurement Study 
(LSMS) survey data, which are in the public domain for three of the Central Asian 
countries. These are high quality household survey data, which can be analysed to estimate 
the determinants of household expenditure, including the role of location.16 The data for 
our analysis are obtained from four Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys: 
the 1993 and 1997 Kyrgyz Republic surveys, the 1996 Kazakhstan LSMS, and the 1999 
Tajikistan LSMS. For Uzbekistan, we use data on households collected in the Fergana 
                                                 
16 The data estimation and results are described more fully in Pomfret and Anderson (2001), and in more 
depth for the Kyrgyz Republic in Anderson and Pomfret (2000). Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) describe 
the limitations of the household budget surveys designed in the Soviet era, and still used in Central Asia 
throughout the 1990s. The LSMS surveys conducted under the aegis of the World Bank are far superior, 
although they still have limitations (Falkingham 1999; Kandiyoti 1999).   10
oblast in 1999 as a pilot study for redesign of the national Household Budget Survey.17 
The sample sizes are for the Kyrgyz Republic 1926 households in 1993 and 2618 in 1997, 
Kazakhstan 1890 households, Tajikistan 1983 households, and Uzbekistan 542 
households.18 
 
Despite the four countries’ historical, cultural and geographical similarities, there are 
differences in the samples. The differences largely reflect the higher incomes and more 
‘European’ culture of Kazakhstan, and the more traditionally Central Asian society in 
Tajikistan and the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan. The Kazakhstan sample is the most urban, 
with 44 percent of households living in rural communities, which is fewer than in the 
Kyrgyz Republic (57 percent in 1993 and 62 percent in 1997), the Fergana oblast of 
Uzbekistan (72 percent) or Tajikistan (73 percent). Households in Kazakhstan are less 
likely to be headed by a man and the head is less likely to be married than households in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan or the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan. Finally, household 
heads in Kazakhstan are older (46 years), on average, than heads in the Kyrgyz Republic 
(40-41), Tajikistan (40), and Uzbekistan (39). 
 
Households are smaller in Kazakhstan than in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or the Kyrgyz 
Republic. In 1996 the average household in Kazakhstan contains 3.6 members, which is 
less than in the Kyrgyz Republic (4.9 in 1993 and 5.5 in 1997), Uzbekistan (6) and 
Tajikistan (7). The average number of children in a household in Kazakhstan is 1.3, which 
is less than in the Kyrgyz Republic (1.8 in 1993 and 2.2 in 1997), Uzbekistan (3.0) or 
Tajikistan (3.5), while the number of elderly household members is similar in each country 
(.4-.5). The number of children is substantially higher than in European transition 
economies or elsewhere in the CIS. 
 
The education variables indicate the high education level, relative to income levels, of 
these countries. Over two-fifths of household heads in each country have post-secondary 
education. In Kazakhstan the proportion with university education is slightly higher than in 
Tajikistan or the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz surveys, especially that of 
1997, report substantially higher proportions of college-educated heads, and fewer heads 
having other post-secondary education than in the other countries, and there is also a sharp 
increase in the proportion of household heads completing secondary education and drop in 
those with incomplete secondary education from 1993 to 1997.19 The other human capital 
                                                 
17 The administrative unit, equivalent to counties or provinces, in the USSR was the oblast. After 
independence the structure was maintained and, although new nomenclatures were adopted, oblast remains a 
universally recognized term. We use the names and jurisdictions at the time of the surveys and ignore 
administrative changes which occurred later (such as the relocation of Kazakhstan’s capital from Almaty to 
Astana, the subdivision of the Osh oblast in the Kyrgyz Republic, or the renaming of the Leninabad oblast in 
Tajikistan).  
18 Summary statistics for each survey are given in Appendix 2, Table A2. 
19 This last change is implausibly large, even allowing for the change in sample composition. The 1997 
numbers for incomplete/complete secondary schooling appear more plausible than those for 1993, when   11
variable, reported health of the household head, also has implausible variations with much 
worse reported health in Kazakhstan and much better in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 
Comparison of the samples’ characteristics suggests that, in many respects, households in 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan are more similar to each other than to households in 
Tajikistan and the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan. In the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, 
compared to the other two countries, households are more likely to be headed by women or 
by an unmarried head, heads are younger and better educated, and households are less 
likely to be in rural areas. In addition, households are smaller and contain fewer 
dependents in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic than in Tajikistan or the Fergana 
oblast of Uzbekistan. 
 
In the next section of the paper, we examine whether differences in these characteristics 
explain the variation in living standards that we observe within and across countries in 
Central Asia. Our measure of well being is household per capita expenditure. We examine 
regional differences in expenditures that cannot be accounted for by differences in the 
measurable characteristics of households in our samples. Residual regional inequality is 
related to the ethnic, cultural, religious, and social differences described in Section 2. 
3  Model and variables 
We estimate a human capital model in which the per capita expenditure of households is 
affected by the level of human capital, the number of household members and other 
demographic characteristics of the household, and the location of the household—see 
Anderson and Pomfret (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the expenditure model. The 
dependent variable is household expenditures per capita, based on a headcount of 
household members and reported expenditures on goods (excluding vehicles), food, health, 
education and other services, housing, utilities, communication, and transportation.20 
Because the log of expenditure more closely follows a normal distribution, we estimate 
semi-logarithmic regressions of the log of per capita expenditure on the household 
characteristics.  
 
To capture household human capital, we include measures of the education and health of 
the household head. For all countries we use dummy variables for college education, other 
post-secondary training, and completed secondary education, with incomplete secondary 
schooling as the omitted education category. For Kazakhstan, we include two non-college 
                                                                                                                                                    
compared to the shares in the neighbouring Fergana oblast. In the econometric estimation the coefficient for 
completed secondary education is not statistically significant apart from in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
20 Expenditure is preferred to income because the arrears problem in former Soviet republics during the 
1990s meant that income often came in lumps and many households reported zero income during the two-
week survey period. We also expected under-reporting to avoid tax or other impositions to be less prevalent 
for expenditure. Non-purchased items, such as food grown on household plots, are valued and included in 
expenditure.   12
post-secondary training variables, differentiating between PTU training and Tecnikum 
education.21 Health is measured by a subjective assessment of the head’s health status; the 
dummy variable is equal to one if the head reports good or very good health and equal to 
zero if health is average, poor, or very poor. 
 
Household composition is measured by three variables describing the number of children 
under the age of 18, the number of elderly, and the number of non-elderly adults in the 
household. An adult is defined as elderly if he or she is eligible for a state pension, 
normally at age 60 for a man and age 55 for a woman. The other demographic 
characteristics include the age, measured in years, gender, and marital status of the head of 
the household. Gender and marital status are captured by dummy variables, respectively 
equal to one if the head is a man and zero if the head is a woman, and equal to one if the 
head is married or cohabiting with a partner and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Location of the household is measured by the interaction of a rural-urban residence dummy 
variable (1=rural, 0=urban) with region-specific variables for the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. In the Kyrgyz Republic, we classify households into four 
groups: resident of Bishkek and other urban areas of Chuy oblast, resident of rural Chuy, 
resident in the rural or urban areas of the southern oblasts of Osh or Djalalabad, and 
resident in the rural or urban areas of the mountain oblasts of Issuk-kul, Narun, or Talas. 
We divide Kazakhstan into six regions: Almaty, rural and urban areas of the southern 
oblasts other than Almaty, and rural and urban residence in the northern, central, western, 
and eastern oblasts.22 We divide Tajikistan into five regions: Gorna-Badakhshan in the 
east, Leninabad in the northwest, Khatlon in the southwest and Dushanbe and the Rayons 
of Republican Subordination (RRS) in the central western area and differentiate between 
the rural and urban areas of all regions with the exception of the capital, Dushanbe.23 In 
each of these three countries, the omitted category for regional location is the largest city 
                                                 
21 Tecnikum education is more academic, providing generic skills related to say computer science, rather 
than the narrower vocational training provided by PTUs. It includes artistic, music, medical, and technical 
education. PTU education is less general or professional and is linked to secondary education. 
22 Almaty was the capital at the time of the LSMS survey, and is the manufacturing and financial centre of 
Kazakhstan. The south is the poorest part of Kazakhstan; it is an agricultural, cotton-growing region, and a 
manufacturing area producing intermediate goods. The north is the main wheat-producing area of the 
country, and also specializes in metallurgy and heavy industry such as steel. The Central region produces 
heavy metals such as chrome, lead and zinc, has coalmines, and grows wheat and other grains.  In the east, 
hydroelectric power is important as well as the mining of light metals and the production of heavy 
equipment. The west is an oil-producing region. 
23 The Gorna-Badakhshan region is sparsely populated and separated from the rest of the country by rugged 
mountains; it is the poorest region, and also culturally distinct. The Leninabad oblast, renamed Sughd in 
2000, is the centre of much of Tajikistan’s manufacturing, as well as lake areas for recreation. Khatlon is the 
centre of cotton production, and a transit point for the illegal drug trade from bordering Afghanistan. In 
Dushanbe and the surrounding RRS agricultural production is depressed, many state enterprises (cement, 
refrigerators, for example) have shut down or significantly reduced their production, and unemployment 
remains high in both the agricultural and non-agricultural regions, although the region is less poor than 
Khatlon or Leninabad.   13
(Bishkek and other urban areas of Chuy oblast, Almaty, and Dushanbe). In Uzbekistan, we 
only include the rural-urban variable because a single oblast was sampled. 
 
In addition to the national level analysis, we compare the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan in 
1999 to the parts of the Kyrgyz Republic in 1997 and Tajikistan in 1999 also located in the 
Ferghana Valley.24 The Ferghana region of the Kyrgyz Republic is defined as the Osh and 
Djalalabad oblasts, while the Ferghana region of Tajikistan is the Leninabad oblast.  
4 Results 
The results of the ordinary least squares regressions are presented in Tables 3a 
(Kazakhstan), 3b (the Kyrgyz Republic, 1993-97), and 3c (Tajikistan). The pooled model 
for the Kyrgyz Republic regresses the log of real per capita expenditures on the 
explanatory variables, with 1993 as the base year (price index = 100) and a 1997 price 
index equal to 369. In Table 4, we present results from expenditure models for the Fergana 
oblast of Uzbekistan and for the Ferghana Valley regions of the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan.25 The explanatory power of the models for the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Kazakhstan are reasonable with R-square of about 0.3. The Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
models are weaker with an R-square for each country of about 0.18. 
4.1 Household location 
The locational variables in Tables 3a–c and 4 are dummies, and the omitted category is the 
capital city with the exception of Uzbekistan. In both the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan a 
household in the capital had significantly higher per capita expenditure, ceteris paribus, 
than a household elsewhere in the country. In Tajikistan (Table 3c) the difference is not 
significant between the capital Dushanbe and the surrounding Rayons of Republican 
Subordination (RRS), but on average a household in the north or the south is about a third 
poorer and one in the Gorna-Badakhshan autonomous region is almost sixty percent poorer 
than an equivalent household in Dushanbe. Rural-urban differences in expenditures are 
small within RRS, Leninabad, and Khatlon. 
 
The results from the Kyrgyz Republic (Table 3b) are even starker, and of special interest 
because this is the only country for which we have more than one survey set. In 1993, 
before the transition to a market economy was far under way, locational differences were 
already significant, with a household in rural Chuy (the province surrounding the capital, 
Bishkek)  27 percent poorer, households in  the south 24 percent (urban) and 69 percent  
                                                 
24 The Ferghana Valley is the most fertile and most densely populated area of Central Asia. In the 1920s and 
1930s, the Ferghana Valley was divided between the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek republics of the USSR with 
economically meaningless borders. 
25 The Uzbekistan pilot and the Ferghana samples are too small for meaningful quantile regression analysis.  
The Tajikistan national survey is also ill-suited to quantile regression, because a large proportion of 
households is in bad financial shape.   14
Table 3a: Expenditure model: Kazakhstan, 1996 
   Ln Expenditures 
Variables   Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept  8.570 93.19
Demographic Traits    
  head is male  0.040 1.15
  age of head  -0.001 -1.04
  head is married  0.043 1.07
Education/health of head    
  college graduate  0.213 4.99
  tecnikum  0.112 2.78
  PTU  0.076 1.49
Completed secondary  -0.009 -0.23
Head in good health  -0.026 -0.86
Location of household    
  rural*central  0.100 1.64
  urban*central  -0.037 -0.67
  rural*south  -0.357 -5.72
  urban*south  -0.431 -7.29
  rural*west  0.024 0.30
  urban*west  0.222 3.10
  rural*north  0.437 7.62
  urban*north  0.289 5.06
  rural*east  0.200 3.47
  urban*east  0.002 0.03
Household composition    
  number of children  -0.169 -13.47
  number of elderly  -0.114 -3.74
  number of non-elderly adults  -0.055 -3.91
  R-square  0.303  
  F-statistic  38.69  
  sample size  1890  
Note: Bold numbers if significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Data obtained from the 1996 LSMS. 
 
(rural) poorer, and households in the mountain region across the middle of the country 18 
percent (urban) and 85 percent (rural) poorer than a household with the same 
characteristics in Bishkek. In 1997, when the transition to a market economy was well 
established, these locational differences had widened to 27 percent (rural Chuy), 65 percent 
(urban south), 83 percent (rural south), 80 percent (urban mountain), and 105 percent (rural 
mountain) relative to Bishkek and the urban north. In all regions and in both 1993 and 
1997, rural households were worse off than urban households.  
   15
Table 3b: Expenditure model: Kyrgyz Republic, 1993-97 
   Ln Expenditure  Ln Expenditure, 1993  Ln Expenditure,1997 
 Variables  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  5.195  61.21  4.863  30.48  7.547  93.82 
Demographic traits         
  head is male  -0.017  -0.39  0.104  1.31  -0.179  -4.16 
  age of head  0.00007  0.07  -0.0006  -0.28  0.001  0.76 
  head is married  0.036  0.93  0.083  1.12  0.062  1.74 
Education/health of head         
  college graduate  0.187  4.96  0.221  3.29  0.135  3.51 
  post-secondary  0.067  1.58  0.110  1.54  -0.073  -1.55 
  completed secondary  -0.077  -1.93 -0.149 -1.88  -0.071 -1.87 
 head in good health  0.032  0.71  0.111  1.22  -0.002  -0.06 
Household location         
  rural chuy  -0.288  -6.63  -0.272  -3.49  -0.317  -7.44 
  rural south  -0.744  -18.28  -0.694  -8.72  -0.839  -22.91 
  urban south  -0.417  -9.11  -0.237  -2.79  -0.648  -15.07 
  rural mountain  -0.940  -23.10  -0.853  -9.80  -1.048  -29.99 
  urban mountain  -0.553  -10.61 -0.185  -1.69 -0.804  -18.08 
Household composition         
  number of children  -0.128  -15.01  -0.123  -7.03  -0.125  -16.61 
  number of elderly  -0.052  -2.96  -0.085  -2.37 0.020  1.16 
  number of non-elderly  -0.028  -3.35 0.002 0.10  -0.085  -9.69 
Year         
  1997  0.666  24.62       
  R-square  0.319    0.15    0.537   
  F-statistic  131.57    22.34    201.45   
  sample size  4515    1913    2618   
Note: Boldface if significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Data obtained from Living Standards Measurement Surveys for 1993 and 1997. 
 
The Kazakhstan results (Table 3a) differ insofar as the largest city (and capital at the time) 
Almaty was not the richest region. Thus, the locational coefficients are positive for the 
north and west and negative for the south and centre, and only the north and south 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. If the poorest region had been the base 
the regional differences would appear at least as strong as those in the Kyrgyz Republic. In 
addition, we find that rural households are better off than urban households in the east, the 
north and the south, but rural households are worse off than urban households in the west. 
There is no difference in the well being of rural and urban households in the central 
oblasts.  
 
The pattern of regional inequality in Kazakhstan is clear from both tables and from 
anecdotal evidence. The oil-producing oblasts by the Caspian Sea (Atyrau and Mangistau)    16
Table 3c: Expenditure model: Tajikistan, 1999 
   Ln Expenditure 
 Variables  Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept  9.911 113.64
Demographic traits   
  head is male  0.017 0.30
  age of head  -0.001 -0.87
  head is married  0.069 1.49
Education/health of head   
  college graduate  0.339 7.15
  post-secondary  0.166 4.08
  completed secondary  0.043 1.06
  head in good health  -0.009 -0.32
Household location   
  rural RRS  -0.066 -1.25
  urban RRS  0.048 0.54
  rural Leninabad  -0.315 -6.21
  urban Leninabad  -0.327 -5.55
  rural Khatlon  -0.324 -6.51
  urban Khatlon  -0.366 -5.65
  Gorna-Badakhshan  -0.585 -7.82
Household composition   
  number of children  -0.087 -12.73
  number of elderly  -0.048 -2.74
  number of nonelderly  -0.005 -0.59
  R-square  0.177
  F-statistic  24.93
  sample size  1983
Note: Bold numbers if significant at the 5% level.  
Source: Data were obtained from the 1999 LSMS. 
 
have relatively high, but volatile, per capita GDP—a phenomenon shared by Almaty City, 
which is believed to be the major beneficiary of petrodollars. The other high GDP oblast is 
Pavlodar in the north, which together with its neighbours, East and North Kazakhstan, is 
the centre of Russian settlement and separatist tendencies. In contrast the four southern 
oblasts, Zhambyl, South Kazakhstan, Qyzlorda and Almaty, are the poorest, and by quite a 
large margin. The gap between north and south is substantial in the raw output data of 
Table 2 and, if anything, even stronger in the locational effects reported in Tables 3a-3c 
when adjustment is made for demographic and human capital attributes. Although 
primarily Kyrgyz, the south contains the Uzbek minority; whether the latter is driven to 
secessionist thoughts by economic inequality may, however, depend upon comparison with 
neighbouring regions of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Syrdarya and Dzhizak) rather than with 
distant parts of Kazakhstan. In the Kyrgyz Republic, per capita GDP differences have   17
widened, with Bishkek and the surrounding Chuy oblast enjoying an increase in 1996-99 
while the poor oblasts of the south became poorer. The relatively sparsely populated 
mountain oblasts had mixed fortunes, driven in part by minerals (especially the Kumtor 
gold project, which accounted for four fifths of national GDP by the end of the 1990s), and 
as in Kazakhstan the benefits from the higher output accrued in part in the capital and 
commercial centre (Bishkek). This phenomenon is reflected in the household expenditure 
analysis for 1993 and 1997, which show households everywhere becoming worse off than 
identical households in Bishkek and the mountain region has the largest locational 
disadvantage. 
Table 4: Expenditure model: Ferghana Region of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan 
 Uzbekistan  Kyrgyz  Republic  Tajikistan 
Variables Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  8.067  32.56  6.890  53.95  9.732  67.90 
Demographic traits           
  head is male  0.0005  0.00  -0.012 -0.172  -0.108  -0.98 
  age of head  0.010  2.60 0.0005  0.33 0.001 0.65 
  head is married  0.049  0.33  -0.060 -1.03 -0.011 -0.12 
Education of head           
  college graduate  0.439  3.12 0.110 1.73 0.237  2.63 
  post-secondary  0.169  1.31  -0.175  -2.33  0.180  2.44 
  completed secondary  0.127 1.01  -0.075  -1.19 0.044 0.60 
  head in good health     -0.076 -1.11  0.064  1.28 
Hh location           
  rural community  -0.530  -6.63  -0.234  -6.26 0.047 0.89 
Hh composition           
  number of children  -0.105  -4.27  -0.114  11.43  -0.106  -7.31 
  number of elderly  0.106  2.24  0.057  2.08 -0.056 -1.85 
  number of non-elderly adults  -0.026  -0.91  -0.071  -5.63  -0.030  -1.96 
  R-square  0.187    0.342    0.14   
  F-statistic  12.16    42.73    8.760   
  sample size  541    915    603   
Note: Bold numbers if significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Data were obtained from LSMSs for the Kyrgyz Republic 1997 and Tajikistan 1999 and the 1999 pilot 
study for the redesigned Household Budget Survey in Uzbekistan. 
 
The data from the other three countries are less rich, but they appear to have less spatial 
inequality than the relatively rapidly reforming Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. In 
Tajikistan incomes fell substantially during the 1992-97 civil war, and although they have 
recovered on average since then, poverty rates remain very high and it is clearly the 
poorest country in Central Asia. The sparsely populated and mountainous Gorno-
Badakhshan autonomous oblast has long been the poorest part of the country and that is 
reflected in Table 3b. The similarity of the coefficients for Leninabad and Khatlon is a   18
little surprising, but this may reflect the higher human capital and other more favourable 
demographic variables in the northern oblast, which is generally viewed as the most 
developed part of the country. Khatlon is more rural and the centre of cotton cultivation in 
Tajikistan, and has suffered relative decline as a result of the droughts which hurt cotton 
harvests in 2000 and 2001. The central region has benefited from the main raw material 
and industrial complex built around the aluminium smelter of Tursunzade, whose output 
has been much reduced since independence but which remains the major foreign exchange 
earner. 
 
Spatial inequality appears to have been least in Uzbekistan. In Table 2, the high-end 
outliers are as elsewhere the capital city (Tashkent) and a mineral-rich underpopulated 
region (Navoi). Otherwise, although the southern oblasts near the Afghanistan border 
(Kashkardaya and Surkhandarya) and the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan are 
poorer and Bukhara richer, the gaps are not extreme. The relative equity is reinforced by a 
government which has maintained public revenue collection and apparently targeted its 
social expenditures effectively (Pomfret 2000a,b). 
 
Turkmenistan is the most difficult country to analyse due to the tight control exerted by the 
government, including controlled access to data.26 The government has an active program 
to create a national road and rail network and has invested in large industrial plant in Lebap 
and Balkan oblasts, but observation suggests that most of the wealth in the country is 
concentrated in the capital, Ashgabat. Social indicators, are as in most of the region, worse 
for rural areas, and the northern oblast of Dashoguz appears to be particularly badly off.27 
4.2 Household composition  
In all four countries, household composition is an important determinant of per capita 
household expenditures. The costs of large households are substantial. A recurring result is 
that additional children lower per capita household expenditure (9 percent in Tajikistan, 12 
percent in Kyrgyzstan, 17 percent in Kazakhstan) by a larger amount than additional 
elderly or non-elderly adults (5 percent and 3 percent in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 12 
percent and 6 percent in Kazakhstan).28 Unsurprisingly, the costs of additional children, in 
                                                 
26 Turkmenistan has held an LSMS survey, but refuses to release results or make the raw data available to 
researchers. Its economic data are the most questionable in the region (Pomfret 2001). 
27 Dashkoguz, like Karakalpakstan, Qyzylorda and, to a slightly lesser extent, Khorezm, suffers from the 
ecological disaster of the desiccation of the Aral Sea which has been associated with increased morbidity and 
mortality. In this paper we say little about environmental issues, but they impinge strongly on feelings of 
regional well being. They are especially important in oblasts affected by the Aral Sea disaster and in areas 
like East Kazakhstan, where radiation from Soviet tests is high and where radioactive waste has been dumped 
since independence. 
28 Use of an equivalence scale (such as E* = E/n
θ where E is household expenditure and n is family size), 
allowing for lower consumption by children, would soften the main conclusion, but it is uncertain which 
equivalence scale would be appropriate. The numerical results are sensitive to the implicit assumption of no 
scale economies in the provision of household services, but similar studies have found that the qualitative 
results are not sensitive to this assumption, e.g. Jovanovic (2001:253) reports that varying θ within a 
plausible range did not alter his results ‘in any significant way’.   19
terms of the negative impact on per capita household expenditure, are larger in the urban 
areas. 
 
When we compare the Ferghana regions of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, we find similarities and differences. In all three countries, an additional child 
lowers per capita household expenditure by about 11 percent. The presence of a pensioner 
has no effect on per capita household expenditure in the Ferghana region of Tajikistan, but 
in the Ferghana region of the Kyrgyz Republic and in the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan the 
presence of a pensioner increases per capita household expenditure by 6 percent in the 
former and by 11 percent in the latter.29 In contrast, non-elderly adults have no impact on 
per capita household expenditures in the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan, but reduce 
expenditures in the Ferghana regions of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic in 1997. This 
suggests that in the Ferghana Valley, the labour market provides enough income to cover 
the average expenditures of adults in Uzbekistan, but cannot cover expenditure needs of 
adults in the poorer countries of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
4.3  Education and health of household head 
In all four countries, having a college-educated head positively affects household living 
standards. In Kazakhstan and in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1993, per capita expenditure is 22 
percent higher in households with a college-educated head than in households whose heads 
failed to complete secondary school.30 In the Kyrgyz Republic, the effect of college 
education drops significantly during the transition period, to 14 percent in 1997. The effect 
of a college-educated head is larger in Tajikistan (34 percent higher per capita household 
expenditure than in households whose head failed to complete secondary education), and 
larger still in the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan (44 percent).31 Overall, general high-skilled 
training has substantially helped household heads improve their families’ standard of 
living. 
4.4 Demographic traits 
The demographic traits in our model—age, gender, and marital status of the head—are 
generally not significant determinants of household expenditures.  
                                                 
29 This is consistent with the evidence that Uzbekistan has been relatively successful in maintaining its social 
policies during the transition from central planning (Pomfret 2000b) and that public service provision broke 
down in Tajikistan. 
30 The independent impact of having a college-educated head is lower in the capital cities than in the country 
as a whole. The difference is small in Kazakhstan, but for Bishkek and Dushanbe the coefficient on the 
college graduate variable, although positive, is not significant at the 5 percent level. 
31 The Uzbekistan estimate is especially striking in light of the smaller than the national average impact in 
the Ferghana region of Tajikistan and the absence of any significant effect of college education on household 
expenditure in the Ferghana region of the Kyrgyz Republic.   20
4.5 Year 
Table 3b presents estimation of the pooled expenditure regression for the Kyrgyz Republic, 
1993-97. We find that real per capita expenditure is 66 percent higher in 1997 than in 
1993, holding other determinants of household expenditure constant. Households are better 
off in the later transition period than in the early period after independence once we control 
for changes in education, region, household composition, and the demographic 
characteristics of the household. The hyperinflation ended, production in mining and 
agriculture increased, and the economy experienced an increase in income after the 
turbulent early transition years. 
4.6 Summary 
In summary, the most important explanations for the variation in expenditures per capita in 
the region are household location, household composition, and education. We find large 
variation in per capita expenditure by location within each country, and the differences go 
beyond the simple rural-urban distinction. Family structure is also important; an increase in 
the number of children in a household reduces household expenditure, and the cost of a 
child to the household exceeds the cost of an extra working or non-working adult.32 The 
human capital variables yield one strong conclusion. In all countries, having a university 
educated household head significantly improves household welfare; expenditures are 
higher in these households than in households with less educated heads. Other levels of 
education, relative to the benchmark of incomplete secondary schooling, do not 
consistently have a positive impact on material well being. The effects of education 
dominate the effects of health on household consumption, but this may be due to the 
limited nature of the subjective measure of health that we use. 
5  Distribution of public services 
Inequality in income and expenditures by households within a country can be mediated by 
government intervention and the provision of public services. Governments could, for 
example, provide more public services to the lowest income communities in which 
households are less able to purchase these goods on their own. In this case, we would 
expect to find more equality in the provision of schools, health clinics, and other public 
goods than in the distribution of income or expenditures. 
 
In this section, we use data on availability of public services at the local community level 
in the Kyrgyz Republic 1997, Kazakhstan 1996, and Tajikistan 1999 to determine whether 
the provision of public goods reinforces or offsets the regional inequality in expenditures 
 
                                                 
32 In the Kyrgyz Republic in 1997 and in the Ferghana regions of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, 
pensioners cost the household less than working age adults, and in the Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan the 
presence of an extra elderly adult significantly increases per capita household expenditure.     21



















Education      
  kindergarten  -0.357  0.060 -0.135 -0.000 0.032 -0.049  -0.079 -0.057
  secondary
a      
  books  -0.405  0.012 0.040 -0.143 -0.238 -0.071 -0.259 -0.016 -0.271
  % in school, age 6-10  -0.638  0.300 -0.075 0.069 -0.200 -0.271 -0.033 0.157  -0.367
  % in school, 11-14  -1.167  0.100 0.044 -0.438 -0.4 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
  % in school, 15-18  -1.078  -4.586 -4.149 -0.364 -1.078 -0.221 -3.864 -8.078  0.636
Healthcare      
  hospital  -0.492  0.036 -0.437 0.071 -0.714 0.186 -0.464  -0.241 
  clinic  -0.206  -0.095 -0.095 -0.146 -0.082   -0.484  -0.229
  ob.gyn.  -0.294  -0.155 -0.516 -0.071 -0.460 0.329 -0.384  -0.016  -0.371
  pediatrician  -0.373  -0.195 -0.124 0.271 -0.366  -0.218 
  pharmacy  -0.325  0.119 -0.214 0.068 -0.022  0.063  -0.514
  lack inst.  0.127  -0.295 -0.214 0.016 -0.229 -0.116 -0.095 -0.029
  lack drugs  0.302  0.190 0.246 0.314 0.257 0.295  0.246 0.157
  low knowledge    0.052 0.080 0.040 0.080 0.046   0.232 
  bad care  -0.302  0.226 -0.079 0.000 0.024 -0.057 -0.045 0.198  -0.357
  poor organization  0.198  0.143 0.143 0.000 -0.024 -0.157 0.018 0.087 0.143
  inadequate primary care  -0.095 -0.012 0.071 0.071 -0.095 -0.229 -0.179 0.016  -0.029
Other services       
  hard roads    -0.008 -0.005 0.010   0.020 
  water    -0.079 0.057 -0.120   -0.128 
  sewer  -0.349  -0.271 0.217 -0.460 -0.264   -0.361 
Note: Bold numbers if significant at the 5% level. Blank cell indicates no estimable rural-urban difference in the 
region. 
aInsufficient  regional variation to estimate a model. 
Source: Data were obtained from the 1996 LSMS. 
 
that we described in Section 4. The public services we examine are classified into three 
groups: education, health care, and other services. The education indicators are: good 
schools (good teachers in the Kyrgyzstan survey), adequate school supplies, adequate 
heating in the schools, adequate books, adequate furniture, sufficient buildings, access to 
secondary school, access to gymnasiums, access to kindergarten, and percent of eligible 
children enrolled in school in the community. The health care indicators are: location of 
hospital, clinic, obstetrician/gynecologist, pediatrician, or pharmacy in the community and 
percent of residents who have been vaccinated. The other services are: post office, hard 
roads, public water service, sewer service, garbage collection, and percent of households 
with telephone service. We have 121 communities in Tajikistan, 230 in Kyrgyzstan, and 
130 in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan survey does not include information on all of the 
services listed above but does include more inquiry on the health care of the community.  
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Education:    
  kindergarten  -.287  0.141 -.432 -0.070 -0.473  0.071
  secondary  0.072  0.020 0.037 -0.075 0.072  0.047
  gymnasium  -0.029  0.445 0.007 0.177 0.013  0.202
  good quality teachers  -0.336  -0.101 -0.291 -0.409 -0.390  -0.120
  adequate buildings    -0.104 -0.153  -0.093
  adequate supplies  0.112  0.010 -0.198 -0.062 -0.163  -0.196
  adequate furniture  -0.052  -0.038 -0.170 -0.133 -0.106 -0.086
  adequate books  0.316 0.394 -0.003 0.047 0.063  0.258
  adequate heat  -0.020  0.050 -0.401 -0.216 -0.207 -0.116
  % in school  -8.913  -4.176 -6.949 -9.207 -9.513 -5.788
Health care:    
  hospital  0.000  0.667 0.060 0.461 -0.013  0.385
  clinic  -0.129  0.418 -0.137 0.235 -0.369 0.214
  ob.gyn.  -0.020  0.474 -0.063 0.256 -0.100 0.144
  pediatrician  0.165  0.460 0.065 0.271 0.045  0.309
  pharmacy  -0.290  -0.009 -0.385 -0.104 -0.437 -0.136
  % vaccinated  -0.209  0.005 0.022 -0.336 -0.022  -0.192
Other services:     
  post office  0.032  0.127 -0.019 -0.150 -0.008  -0.007
  hard roads  -0.380  0.034 -0.721 -0.325 -0.793  -0.008
  water    -0.195 -0.157 -0.380  -0.030
  sewer  -0.353  -0.040 -0.584 0.028  
  garbage collection  -0.565  0.049 -0.791 -0.310 -0.819  -0.099
Note: Bold numbers if significant at the 5% level; blank cell indicates no estimable rural-urban difference in the 
region. 
Source: Data were obtained from the 1997 LSMS. 
 
We tabulated by region the proportion of communities in these countries that have these 
services. We tested whether the region and service availability are independent events for 
each service in each country, and rejected the null hypothesis of independence. To 
determine where the regional differences are largest, we estimated robust linear probability 
regression models of service availability in the community and regression models of school 
enrolment and vaccination rate in which the independent variables are the regional dummy 
variables. We control for rural-urban regional differences where possible. In some cases, 
there was no variation in service availability within a region or between the rural and urban 
areas of a region; in those cases the regions were dropped from the analysis. The regression 
results are given in Tables 5a (Kazakhstan), 5b (Kyrgyzstan), and 5c (Tajikistan). 
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We find considerable regional variation in the availability of services within each country 
but less inequality in service distribution in Kazakhstan than in the other countries. In 
Kazakhstan (Table 5a), there is no measured inequality in education services with one 
exception; the rural east region is less likely to report kindergartens and adequate school 
books than other regions. We also find little variation in access to other public services 
with the exception of sewer services which are less available in the central, urban west, and 
rural east regions of the country. In contrast, there is significant regional inequality in the 
distribution of health care services, and we find fewer health care services in rural areas of 
each region than in the urban areas. Specifically, the rural areas report fewer hospitals and 
physicians than other areas of the country. 
Table 5c: Public service regressions: regional inequality, Tajikistan 1999 












Education           
 kindergarten  -0.418  -0.434   -0.049    -0.455   
  secondary   0.072 0.020 0.037  -0.075  0.072  0.047 
  gymnasium    -0.256    -0.119  0.485  -0.304 0.095 
  good quality schools    -0.290   -0.226  0.121  -0.310  
  adequate buildings  0.509 0.524    0.373  0.818 0.538 0.784 
  adequate supplies    -0.229  0.061  -0.201  0.000  -0.225   
  adequate furniture    -0.523    -0.164   -0.437  
  adequate books   0.316 0.394  -0.003 0.047  0.063  0.258 
  adequate heat    0.055  0.214  0.024  0.517    
  % in school   -8.913 -4.176  -6.949 -9.207  -9.513  -5.788 
Healthcare           
  hospital  0.350  0.404   0.494    0.517  
  clinic  0.150  0.288   0.468    0.215   
 ob.gyn.  0.350  0.519    0.519    0.415  
  pediatrician  -0.036  0.171   0.338    0.068   
  pharmacy  -0.225  0.183    0.298    0.096   
  % vaccinated    -0.209  0.005  0.022  -0.336  -0.022  -0.192 
Other  services           
  post office    0.084    0.494   0.000   
  hard roads  -0.55  -0.173   -0.16    -0.076  
  water  -0.408      -0.038   -0.103   
  sewer  -0.578 -0.647 -0.111  -0.393    -0.692  -0.153 
garbage collection  -0.425  -0.538  0.042  -0.411  0.284  -0.454  0.125 
Note: Bold numbers if significant at the 5% level; blank cell indicates no estimable rural-urban difference in the 
region.  
Source: Data were obtained from the 1999 Living Standards Measurement Survey. 
 
In Kyrgyzstan (Table 5b), significant regional differences exist in education services, 
healthcare, and other services. Among the education services, we find that the mountain   24
and southern areas of the country have fewer kindergartens, lower quality teachers, 
inadequate facilities, and lower enrolment in school than the northern areas of Chuy and 
Bishkek. Within each region, the rural areas tend to have fewer services than the urban 
areas. Among the health care indicators, we find that the urban areas of Chuy, the south, 
and the mountain regions are more likely to report a hospital, clinic, or physician than the 
rural areas or Bishkek, and pharmacies are less available in rural areas. Finally, among the 
other services, hard roads, and water, sewer, and garbage services are unequally 
distributed. The mountain oblasts have fewer other services than the other regions, and, 
within each region, rural areas are less likely to have services than urban areas. In all cases, 
services are more available in the north (Chuy and Bishkek) than in the mountainous 
regions or the southern agricultural area.  
 
In Tajikistan (Table 5c), education, health, and other services differ significantly across 
regions, but the distributional pattern is less obvious than in Kyrgyzstan. Among education 
services, kindergartens are less likely but secondary schools are more likely in rural areas 
than urban. School enrolment in rural and urban areas of Leninabad, RRS, and Khatlon is 
lower than in Dushanbe, but Dushanbe has inadequate school buildings and an inadequate 
supply of school books in comparison to other regions. Leninabad seems to have more 
availability of healthcare facilities (hospitals, clinics, and pediatricians) than other regions, 
and vaccination rates are high in all regions but lowest in urban areas of Leninabad and 
Khatlon. Among other services, we find greater access to hard roads, water, sewer, and 
garbage collection in Dushanbe than in other regions, and the rural regions have less access 
to these services than the urban areas.  
 
This evaluation of the distribution of public services in the three countries suggests that 
provision of public goods reinforces regional inequality patterns in expenditures that we 
measured among households. The poorest households are likely to live in communities 
with the lowest access to public services. We try to determine why these regional 
differences exist by looking at the effect of community characteristics on the availability of 
these services. The community characteristics measure the employment base of the 
community, income, population, ethnicity, and regional isolation. In general, the most 
important determinant of service location is rural-urban residence; rural communities are 
less likely to have services than urban communities, and, within rural and urban areas, 
large population areas seem to have greater access to many public services. We also find 
some evidence that the ethnic composition of the community does influence service 
location, generally in favour of Slavic communities in each country. The results from this 
analysis of community characteristics are available from the authors on request. 
6 Conclusions 
In Central Asia, although international migration took place on a large scale, internal 
migration did not. In the Kyrgyz Republic, which probably has the most liberal labour and 
housing markets in the region, there has been internal migration but it has been primarily   25
within regions, from rural areas in the northern oblasts of Chuy, Talas, Naryn and Issyk-
kul to urban centres, especially Bishkek, with little migration from the poorer south to the 
richer north. The LSMS evidence establishes that, even in what are the three least-
regulated economies there is not a national labour market. Given the tighter control over 
the economy and over internal mobility in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it is safe to 
conclude that labour mobility is not reducing spatial inequality to any great extent in the 
Central Asian countries. This is somewhat surprising insofar as we might have expected 
the move to a market economy to be followed by establishment of national labour markets 
with people relocating in response to economic incentives. Two main sets of explanations 
can be offered for why this did not happen: the economies are not physically integrated, 
and social factors discourage mobility. The infrastructure prevents a national economy 
being established.33 The Soviet transport network ignored republic boundaries and many 
regions were better connected to the Tashkent rail hub or, in the case of northern 
Kazakhstan, to Russian cities, than to their republic’s capital. In the southeast, physical 
boundaries are formidable, with the Ferghana Valley blocked from the rest of Uzbekistan, 
northern and southern Kyrgyz Republic separated, and many parts of Tajikistan cut off by 
snow in winter.34 Since independence, all five countries have aimed to create national 
transport networks, with Turkmenistan devoting most resources to the specific task and 
impoverished Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic suffering from acute resource 
constraints. 
 
The extended family is very strong in Central Asia. Buckley (1998:72) has argued that 
these ties are so strong that people will prefer to remain in their place of birth within the 
family than to move elsewhere for higher economic returns. The international migration 
has largely concerned non-Central Asian groups such as Germans and Slavs, while Central 
Asian groups have not relocated. Central Asian groups have not tended to migrate across 
borders, in particular there have not been cross-migrations of people to their ‘ethnic 
homeland’ (e.g., Turkmen to Turkmenistan and Uzbeks to Uzbekistan in the 
Khorezm/Dashoguz region) as happened between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the early 
1990s. 
 
                                                 
33 In the product market context, Aghion and Schankerman (1999) emphasize the role of improved 
infrastructure in reducing transactions costs and hence increasing competition, and their argument is 
supported by the convergence of infrastructure in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic towards West 
European standards; in all three countries the degree of competition appears to have been increasing. Similar 
causality works in labour markets; an oft-cited example is the impact of US road-building in eastern Thailand 
during the 1960s in creating a national labour market and contributing to the rapid economic growth in 
Thailand during the final quarter of the twentieth century. 
34 Tajikistan’s main north-south road from Dushanbe to Khujand (Leninabad) is riddled with potholes and 
key passes are controlled by local warlords such as Rahmon Sanginov, whose nom de guerre is Hitler and 
who is treated as a Robin Hood figure by his admirers and as a terrorist by the government. The highest pass 
on this road is closed form October to May, but tunnels begun in the Soviet era remain unfinished. In July 
2001 the approach road to the tunnel, which was off-limits to foreigners, showed no sign of construction 
activity.   26
There are limits to non-mobility. In the dire economic conditions of Tajikistan in the late 
1990s migration did increase, although this consisted mainly of males moving to Russia in 
search of work (and sending remittances to their families), rather than internal migration. 
Tajiks and Uzbeks (and others) have fled from Afghanistan and live as refugees in border 
areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, although the economic impact of these movements is 
secondary. 
 
The lack of price integration in the national labour markets implies economic inefficiency, 
in the sense that moving labour from low to high-wage locations could increase national 
output. However, the welfare implications of the two explanations of the spatial 
differentials matter. In the first case infrastructural improvements yield a clear benefit in 
terms of allocative improvement. On the other hand, if people chose not to move due to 
non-pecuniary benefits of staying put, then improved infrastructure will have less welfare 
benefit. How does spatial inequality align with ethnic or other divisions? In our 
econometric work on the LSMS data, ethnicity has very little independent impact as a 
determinant of per capita household expenditure. Nevertheless, ethnicity is likely to 
become associated with spatial inequalities given the regional clustering of ethnic 
minorities. 
 
The Slavs and other Europeans tend to be concentrated in the largest cities, apart from in 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic where there are also large rural communities, in the 
north of each country. In general, the Slavs and Europeans are located in the more 
economically flourishing regions. In the Kyrgyz Republic, however, there is an implicit 
communality of interest between the Slavs and the Kyrgyz in the north, and the major 
divide is north-south. Moreover, many of the Slavs and Europeans emigrated during the 
1990s, and they presumably included the most discontented and most dynamic members of 
those ethnic groups. Given the relatively high human capital endowment of these groups 
and an age distribution of migrants, which tended to be relatively concentrated in working 
age adults, this emigration was a serious economic cost to the countries concerned, 
although it contributed to political stability by increasing ethnic homogeneity. The only 
real remaining source of tension is in northern Kazakhstan where Russian communities are 
still large and concentrated in areas contiguous to the Russian Federation, and their relative 
wealth may make them fearful of what they might perceive as a rapaciously redistributing 
central government dominated by Kazakhs. 
 
Perhaps of more concern are potential tensions among native Central Asian ethnic groups, 
especially where these tensions could fuel irredentist claims. The Uzbek minorities, for 
example, are concentrated near to the borders of Uzbekistan in South Kazakhstan, in 
southern parts of the Kyrgyz Republic, in the Dashoguz oblast of Turkmenistan, and in the 
Leninabad oblast (and small pockets in the western parts of RRS) in Tajikistan. The first 
three of these locations are among the poorest parts of the countries concerned. If they feel 
disadvantaged within their current country the Uzbek minorities might yearn for secession, 
although this is more likely if they live in poorer countries (Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz   27
Republic) than if they live in Kazakhstan. Regional differentiation can also fuel other 
conflicts. The densely populated Ferghana Valley oblasts of Uzbekistan (Fergana, 
Namangan and Andijan) and the neighbouring regions of Kyrgyz Republic (Jalalabad, Osh 
and Batken) are fertile grounds for Islamic extremists and will become more so if these 
regions continue to lag economically.35  
 
This paper measures the existence and persistence of regional inequality in household 
resources and public goods. It does not offer a policy solution to the inequality we observe 
in the 1990s in Central Asia. A high degree of persistent inequality can exacerbate internal 
political and social problems and promote regional instability; economic growth and 
performance can be negatively affected by inequality. The government has a responsibility 
to address the concerns of all citizens and can use its resources to balance, to a certain 
extent, regional differences in resource availability. The governments of these countries 
have not as yet equalized access to schools, hospitals, and other services that are vital to 
growth. Policy should focus more resources on correcting these imbalances; regional 
stability may hinge on the success of redistributive policy actions.  
                                                 
35 In March 2001 a Batken schoolteacher commented, ‘It’s the same everywhere. The villages are empty of 
young men—either they have gone to Russia to look for work or they join Namangani [leader of the IMU 
fighters] because at least he pays them’ (Rashid 2001:29).   28
Appendix 1: Administrative divisions 
Table A1: Administrative divisions 
(a) Kazakhstan
1   
Oblast Capital  Population  (1999)
Almaty Almaty  (Alma-Ata)  1,560
  Almaty City    1,129
Akmola Astana  (Akmolinsk/Tselinograd)  837
  Astana    318
Aqtöbe Aqtöbe  (Aktiubinsk)  683
Atyrau Atyrau  (Gurev)  439
East Kazakhstan  Öskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk)  1,533
Karaganda Karaganda  1,414
Mangystau (Mangyshlak)  Aqtau (Shevchenko)  316
North Kazakhstan  Petropavl (Petropavlovsk)  727
Pavlodar Pavlodar  807
Qostanay Qostanay  (Kustanai)  1,022
Qyzylorda Qyzylorda  (Kzyl-Orda)  596
South Kazakhstan  Shymkent (Chimkent)  1,974
West Kazakhstan  Oral (Uralsk)  618
Zhambyl Zhambyl  (Dzhambul)  984
(b) Kyrgyz Republic
2   
Population (1999)  Oblast Capital 
(thousands) (people/km
2)
Chuy Bishkek  (Frunze)  771  38
Issyk-Kul Karakol  (Przhevalsk)  413  10
Jalalabad Jalalabad  869  26
Naryn Naryn  249  6
Osh Osh  1,176  34
Talas Talas  200  17
Batken Batken  382 
Bishkek City    762  6215
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(c) Tajikistan
3    
Population (2000)   
Viloyat 
 
Capital  (thousands) (people/km
2)
Khatlon Gulab  2,151  87
Leninabad (Sughd)  Khujand  1,870   72
RRS Dushanbe  1,338  47
  Dushanbe (Stalinabad)    562  4390
Viloyati avtonomi     
Gorno-Badakhshan Khorugh  (Khorog)  206 3
(d) Turkmenistan
4    
Velayat Capital   
Akhal Ashgabat  (Ashkhabad)   
Balkan Nebitdag   
Dashoguz Dashoguz  (Tashauz)   
Lebap Turkmenabat  (Charjew/Chardzhou) 
Mary Mary  
(e) Uzbekistan
5  
Population (2000)  
Oblast 
 
Capital  (thousands) (people/km
2)
Andijan Andijan  (Andizhan)  2,195  522
Bukhara Bukhara  1,424  35
Dzhizak Dzhizak  979  46
Fergana Fergana  2,672  399
Kashkadarya Qarshi  (Karshi)  2,179  76
Khorezm Urgench  1,330  217
Namangan Namangan  1,933  261
Navoi Navoi  786  7
Samarkand Samarkand  2,680  160
Syrdarya Gulistan  644  150
Surkhandarya Termez  1,746  87
Toshkent Toshkent  (Tashkent)  2,356  290
Tashkent City    2,142 
Autonomous Republic     
Karakalpakstan Nukus  1,510  9
Notes: Names in parentheses are former names or alternative spellings. 
1In 1994 the Parliament approved transfer of the capital from Almaty to Akmola, which was subsequently 
renamed Astana. After a preliminary inauguration in November 1997, the new capital was officially 
inaugurated in June 1998.  
2Bishkek is the national capital as well as capital of Chuy oblast. In 2000 Osh oblast was sub-divided into two, 
and a new oblast created with its capital at Batken.    30
3Dushanbe, the national capital, is located in the Regions of Republican Subordination (RRS), but is the only 
one whose executive is directly subordinate to the national government. Khatlon viloyat was formed in early 
1993 by amalgamating Gulab and Kurgan-Teppe oblasts.  
4Ashgabat is the national capital as well as capital of Ahal velayat.  
5Tashkent is the national capital as well as capital of Tashkent oblast.  
Source:  Kazakhstan: population data are from Human Development Report Kazakhstan 2000. Kyrgystan: 
population data from 1999 census; density data are preliminary estimates from United Nations Kyrgyzstan 
Common Country Assessment (UN 1999:38). Tajikistan: population data are from Tajikistan Human 




In Table 3, household location is measured by a region-specific dummy variable interacted 
with a rural-urban residence variable. In each of these three countries, the omitted category 
for regional location is the largest city (Almaty, Bishkek, and Dushanbe). Kazakhstan is 
divided into six regions: 
 
•   Almaty, the capital at the time of the LSMS survey, and the manufacturing and 
financial center of the country. 
•   Southern oblasts other than Almaty—the south is the poorest part of Kazakhstan; it is 
an agricultural, cotton-growing region, and a manufacturing area producing 
intermediate goods. 
•   Central oblasts—the central region produces heavy metals such as chrome, lead and 
zinc, has coalmines, and grows wheat and other grains.  
•   Northern oblasts—the north is the main wheat-producing area of the country, and 
also specializes in metallurgy and heavy industry such as steel.  
•   Western oblasts—the west is the oil-producing region. 
•   Eastern oblasts—in the east, hydroelectric power is important as well as the mining 
of light metals and the production of heavy equipment.  
In the Kyrgyz Republic, we classify households into four regions:  
•   Bishkek. 
•   Chuy, but not Bishkek—rural Chuy is a primarily agricultural region, but proximity 
to Bishkek makes it relatively affluent and one of the higher growth areas of the 
country. 
•   The southern oblasts of Osh and Djalalabad—the south is the main cotton-growing 
region but also contains Osh, which is the second largest city in the country and a 
manufacturing center. The south is the most deeply Islamic part of the country.  
•   The mountain oblasts of Issuk-kul, Narun, and Talas—the mountain region was 
known for pastoral farming during the early transition period, but agriculture has 
developed into more vegetable production and less sheep production during the later 
transition years in this region. 
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We divide Tajikistan into five regions: 
•   Dushanbe. 
•   Rayons of Republican Subordination (RRS) in the central western area—although 
the region is less poor than Khatlon or Leninabad, in Dushanbe and the surrounding 
RRS agricultural production is depressed, many state enterprises (cement, 
refrigerators, for example) have shut down or significantly reduced their production, 
and unemployment remains high in both the agricultural and non-agricultural 
regions. 
•   Leninabad in the northwest—the Leninabad oblast is the centre of much of 
Tajikistan’s manufacturing, as well as lake areas for recreation.  
•   Khatlon in the southwest—a heterogeneous province, with conflicts between more 
established groups and groups arriving from central and eastern Tajikistan during the 
cotton expansion of the 1950s and 1960s. The western part (Qurghon Teppa) is the 
centre of cotton production, while the eastern part (Gulab) is poorer. Khatlon also has 
to deal with the illegal drug trade from bordering Afghanistan.  
•   Gorno-Badakhshan in the east—the Gorno-Badakhshan region is sparsely populated 
and separated from the rest of the country by rugged mountains; it is the poorest 
region, and also culturally distinct.  
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Appendix 2 
Table A2: Summary statistics 
   Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Rep Kyrgyz Rep Tajikistan  Fergana
Variables (1996) (1993) (1997) (1999)  (Uzbekistan)
Per capita expenditure 4863.76 144.61 782.00 15,636  4099.36
  (national currency units)  (3515.27) (140.26) (921.11) (13,095)  (3869.45)
Demographic traits  
  male head (%)  61.6 81.8 86.9 91.3  93.9
  head is married (%)  72.1 77.5 77.3 85.5  90.8
  age of head (years)  46.326 41.337 39.751 39.850  38.760
 (14.218) (13.722) (12.642) (11.047)  (10.444)
Education of head  
  college graduate (%)  18.2 25.1 32.7 14.8  14.4
  post-secondary (%)  23.2 24.5 10.8 34.6  29.4
  post-secondary – contd.  10.6  
  completed secondary (%)  25.5 16.9 43.8 36.0  45.3
  incomplete secondary (%)  22.5 33.5 12.7 14.6  10.9
Health of head   
  head in good health (%)  28.9 90.7 90.5 69.3 
location of household:  
  rural community (%)  43.6 57.1 62.6 72.8  71.5
  capital city (%)  9.4 18.4 15.1 8.9 
  region 1 (%)  20.7 22.7 13.9 4.0 
  region 2 (%)  18.1 39.1 35.0 21.5 
  region 3 (%)  8.5 19.8 36.0 30.4 
  region 4 (%)  22.3 35.2 
  region 5 (%)  21.0  
Household composition:  
  number of children  1.263 1.822 2.239 3.515  2.850
 (1.228) (1.690) (1.740) (2.071)  (1.601)
  number of elderly  0.414 0.511 0.507 0.492  0.492
 (0.676) (0.731) (0.732) (0.733)  (0.742)
  number of non-elderly adults  1.914 2.603 2.846 3.065  2.643
   (1.119) (1.800) (1.472) (1.812)  (1.395)
sample size (households)  1890 1926 2618 1983  541
Notes: Standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses. For Kazakhstan post-secondary 
education is divided between Tecnikum and PTU. The regions are: Kazakhstan 1 = Central, 2 = South, 3 = 
West, 4 = North, 5 = East (excluding Almaty); Kyrgyz Republic 1 = Chuy, 2 = South, 3 = Mountain; Tajikistan 1 
= Gorna Badakhshan, 2 = RSS, 3 = Leninabad, 4 = Khatlon. 
Source: Data were obtained from 1993 and 1997 Kyrgyz Republic, 1996 Kazakhstan, and 1999 Tajikistan 
Living Standards Measurement Surveys and the 1999 pilot study for the redesign of the Household Budget 
Survey in Uzbekistan.   33
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